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Abstract 
This article takes violence in the law seriously, scrutinizing three sites engaged in 
violent subject production and resistance: the Guantanamo Bay detention center, 
supermax prisons in the US, and European refugee camps. The concepts of 
martyring and torturing serve help to untangle the dynamics of the law’s violence. 
The violent subject production techniques used in these sites are discussed as 
torture practices that aim to reproduce the dominant subjectivity. As the law has 
often proved unable to fully address the situation of the detainee, the prisoner, and 
the refugee, hunger striking as martyring is discussed as a way to deconstruct 
hegemonic subjectivity and to force the law to face its own violence. 
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A I. Introduction 
 
Who gets banned and expelled so that we can live in reasonable consensus? Let us 
name them now. Criminals. Security Threats. Terrorists. Enemy Aliens. Illegal 
Immigrants. Migrant Contaminants. Unlawful Enemy Alien Combatants. Ghost 
Detainees […] These are new orders of life; they hover outside the bounds of the 
civil, beyond simple dichotomies of reason and unreason, legal and illegal.1  
 
What kinds of beings does the law create? What kinds of beings does it destroy? 
This article is based on the idea that the law is what the law does, and that it is 
worthwhile to take a closer look into what the law actually does besides providing 
answers to legally formulated questions. The main aim is to explore how the law 
violently calls subjects into being in the practices of the Guantanamo Bay detention 
center, in high security (supermax) prisons, and in European refugee camps, and 











between the subjects as they know themselves and as the state wants them to know 
themselves.  
Underneath these questions lies a bigger one: what is the relationship between the 
law and the state? The state and the (state’s) law both presume each other. If the 
law is genuinely equated with what it does, the law and the state cannot be 
completely separated from each other. The state cannot escape the law; it cannot 
create places or operate outside the law, and thus it contributes directly to what the 
law in fact does. An illustrative example of how the law and the state are 
inseparably intertwined is the Guantanamo Bay detention center. Despite aspiring 
to create a place outside the law where it could operate without considering US law, 
the US government has created another kind of law, parallel to the law applied in 
US territories. All that takes place in Guantanamo takes place within a legal 
framework, not outside of it.2  
It has long been recognized that the law in books is one thing, while the law in 
action is another. This approach, however, is restricted in that it seems to assume 
that if the law was applied by the book, the distinction would disappear and the law 
would be one.3 Besides its workings in books and in action, the law also does 
something else: it participates in creating the world we live in by producing 
meaning. Here I adopt a Derridean understanding of meaning production: language 











rather it reproduces and creates new interrelations between signs, thus generating 
new interpretations of the world. Moreover, the law need not be limited to its 
normative aspects or to the acts of certain agents over those of others; instead of 
being this rather than that, law can be both this and that at once. 
The conception of law to which this article commits derives from such theorists as 
Colin Dayan, Scott Veitch, and Robert M. Cover, all of whom acknowledge the 
violent side of law.4 Dayan reminds us that there is no escape from law, even in 
places that are sometimes called legal black holes, such as Guantanamo, Abu 
Ghraib, and other secret detention centers throughout the world.5 According to 
Veitch, law and legal institutions are, contrary to common perception, central in 
deflecting responsibility from extensive human rights violations. For him, this is 
not due to the deficits in the substance of the law, but is an intrinsic feature of the 
law itself.6 A similar idea has been promoted by Cover, who claims that violent law 
is not a corrupt version of the law, but an inevitable, inseparable part of it, and that 
the law cannot remain innocent to atrocities committed in its name.7 
By violence of the law, Cover means the law’s tendency to reproduce itself and its 
subjectivities by destroying competing worlds; while the law reproduces some 
traditions, it kills others.8 Cover’s argument resonates with Foucault’s notion of 











disqualified and deemed inferior to the dominant truth.9 In this article, the focus is 
on the battle over whose truth about the self persists. 
Foucault’s analysis of subject production contrasts power with force and violence. 
Power is subtle in that it seeks the collaboration of its subjects. In many subtle 
ways, power invites subjects to commit to reproducing themselves through 
practices of self-mastery. This individualizing power requires that subjects 
internalize the dominant truth about themselves and reproduce it with techniques 
that aim to self-mortify (i.e. self-renounce). According to Foucault, even when 
overwhelming, power is never absolute; there is always room for resistance.10 
While power relations can only be exercised over free subjects, violence “acts upon 
a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it 
closes the door on all possibilities.” 11 Violent subject production takes place in the 
intersection between power and violence: despite the subjection of the detainee, the 
prisoner and the refugee to various physically and mentally violent practices, their 
treatment does not ultimately aim at crushing their existence as human beings, but 
instead at making them adopt a new truth about themselves.  
The dynamics of violent subject production are discussed in this article using the 
terms torturing and martyring. By torture I mean the techniques used in closed 
facilities that violently produce subjects, and which aim to destroy the victim’s 











legal definitions of torture. Rather, the torturer aims to destroy “the victim’s 
normative world and capacity to create shared realities” and is designed to 
demonstrate the end of their normative world, “the end of what the victim values, 
the end of the bonds that constitute the community in which the values are 
grounded.”12 The battle is ultimately about whose reality, whose truth, and whose 
world survives. The martyr, on the other hand, “insists in the overwhelming force 
that if there is to be continuing life, it will not be in terms of the tyrant’s law. [...] 
Martyrs require that any future they possess will be on the terms of the law to 
which they are committed. And the miracles of the suffering of the martyrs is their 
insistence on the law to which they are committed, even in the face of world-
destroying pain. [...] Martyrdom is an extreme form of resistance to domination. 
[...] A legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place 
bodies on the line.”13  
Here, resistance does not target an institution, but power techniques which impose a 
certain kind of subjectivity on the individual. With their bodies, martyrs resist 
internalizing the dominant truth, which is the truth about themselves as deviants. 
By portraying hunger striking as martyring, I do not wish to glorify martyring or to 
claim that it is an act of an ideal political subject, nor do I believe it to be the most 
effective mode of resistance regarding changing state policies. Rather, I claim that 











is an act which forces the law to face its own violence. 
By refusing to eat, hunger strikers refuse the subjectivity imposed on them, thereby 
bringing the possibility of death to the heart of their relationship with the state.14 
Hunger strikers deconstruct their legal subjectivity; they are willing, literally, to let 
the subject die along with their own bodies. Because hunger strikers refuse to 
address the law with language recognizable to the law, the law cannot address them 
back; they are deaf to the law’s interpellation.15 The law can only decide whether to 
let the body of the hunger striker die.16  
This article is divided into four main sections and a concluding section. First, the 
production of the subjectivities of the detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee is 
discussed as a means of bringing the individuals placed in the Guantanamo Bay 
detention center, the supermax prison, and refugee camps into being as subjects to 
power. Secondly, the practices that are here called torture, are discussed in more 
detail in each of the three sites. The two subsequent sections discuss the legal and 
extra-legal resistance strategies adopted by the individuals, especially paying 
attention to hunger striking as a means of revealing the violent side of the law and 
as an alternative to legal channels in challenging the fundamental aspects of violent 












A II. Subject production in the Guantanamo, the supermax, and the refugee 
camp 
 
What kinds of subjects inhabit the Guantanamo Bay detention center, the supermax 
prison, and refugee camps? The three sites form an interesting triangle of 
subjectification. While it is important to acknowledge the differences between the 
contexts and the legal status of the detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee, the 
subject production practices in the three sites have significant resemblances. 
The prison is an iconic site of subject production, an arena in which the state asserts 
its power both to define the limits of citizenship and to confine those who deviate 
from that designation. In prison, the deviant, pathologized subject is corrected and 
rehabilitated, stored, and fit into the frame of a manageable deviant subject.17 
Ultimately, subject production is part of the production and maintenance of the 
state itself.18  
Although the supermax prison as a penal institution and the Guantanamo Bay 
detention center as a military institution obviously differ, they both operate with the 
same logic of subject production: both are arenas where the battle rages over whose 
world and whose truth will survive.19  Despite becoming part of the mass 











importance to the state. In refugee camps, however, this is exactly what happens; 
unlike in prison, the refugee is not the target of rehabilitation techniques, and the 
process does not aim to (re)integrate them into society, and unlike in Guantanamo, 
the aim is not to transform immigrants into docile and useful collaborators of the 
dominant regime. The refugee camp parallels the prison in that they can both be 
described as storage facilities for a so-called waste population.20 But the subject 
production process is different in the prison and in the camp: the prison is the 
ultimate site for producing manageable deviant subjects, whereas the camp simply 
restores people who are stuck in the limbo between being inside and outside of 
society.  
What is common to the detainee at Guantanamo and the prisoner in the supermax is 
danger – both are by default designated as dangerous to the rest of society, both are 
subject positions that are per se considered deviant. The refugee, on the other hand, 
is different from the detainee and the prisoner in that the refugee is, as an 
individual, irrelevant to the state. Therefore, as an individual feature, the aspect of 
danger is lacking from the refugee subjectivity. However, as discussed in the 
concluding section, this may be changing in Europe as refugees are increasingly 
suspected of potential terrorism, as well as being perceived as a growing economic 
and social threat.  











the law, either officially or unofficially. The torture techniques include the 
enhanced interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay; solitary confinement, 
debriefing, and the Step Down policy in the supermax; and the poor living 
conditions and practices that effectively block access to justice both inside and 
outside of refugee camps.  
Both at Guantanamo Bay and the supermax, the inmates are first subjected to 
mortification practices generally used in prison environments: they are stripped of 
their individuality by shaving their heads and facial hair, dressed in a uniform, and 
stripped of their names. Mortification practices explain how those with power are 
able to overcome the natural resistance to inflict pain on other individuals.21 
Agamben has regarded the depersonified Guantanamo detainees as modern-day 
Homo Sacer, bare life – individuals stripped of citizenship and legal identity – and 
compared them in this respect to the Jews in Nazi camps. Indeed, the detention 
center has been described as a non-place similar to the concentration camp:  a place 
outside the law, a legal black hole, and a prison beyond the law.22  Similarly, the 
detainees have been described as legally unclassifiable and unnamable beings; they 
are not prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention nor have they been charged 
with a crime under US laws. Instead, they are simply detainees, with reduced legal 
subjectivity. 











sense that the law no longer protected that person. This meant that the state treated 
them with indifference, and that they could be killed with impunity.23 However, the 
prisoner at the supermax and the detainee at Guantanamo have not become bare life 
in the sense that the law treats their existence as individuals with indifference, quite 
the contrary. The prisoners and especially the detainees have, arguably, been the 
subject of extensive work on legal classification and regulation requiring a special 
set of techniques to process them as individuals.24  
Law’s relationship with the refugee subject is different from its relationship with 
the detainee and the prisoner, who are defined by danger. The resistance strategies 
adopted by the detainee and the prisoner ultimately target precisely this aspect of 
their subjectivity, as it is the decisive feature justifying their treatment as less than 
human. Refugees, on the other hand, have not been touched by the law in the sense 
that they have not been, before processing their individual cases, recognized by the 
law as individuals. While the detainee and the prisoner struggle to be seen 
differently by the law, the refugee struggles to be recognized as somebody by the 
law. These struggles are illustrated in the following sections by discussing the 
violent subject production techniques used in the three sites on the one hand, and 
the legal and extra-legal resistance strategies adopted by the detainee, the prisoner, 













A  III. Torture practices 
 
B   1 Enhanced interrogation techniques 
 
They pull you apart and put you back together, dismantling into smaller pieces 
each time, until you become something different, their creation, when eventually 
reassembled. [...]Interrogators worked around the clock to break us. Once broken, 
detainees were asked to agree to anything by interrogators, to repeat after them, to 
sign confessions, to be false witnesses, or to sow discord amongst detainees.25  
 
Since 2002, the US has used the Guantanamo Bay naval base as a detention center 
for individuals captured from all over the world in the war on terrorism.26 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, congress passed the 
Authorization to Use Military Force, which granted the President the authority to 
“use all necessary and appropriate force” against those who had committed or aided 
the terrorist attacks. The legal status of these individuals, who have been deemed 
enemy combatants, has developed in a dialogue between the US administration and 
Supreme Court rulings.27 The situation of the Guantanamo detainees is complicated 
with conflicting rulings, overlapping legal sources, and practical difficulties. 











were still being held in indefinite detention in January 2016, even though many of 
them were cleared for release a long time ago.28 
The so called enhanced interrogation techniques were introduced in the aftermath 
of September 11, 2001 and used, besides at Guantanamo, in multiple other 
detention sites operated by US officials all over the world. The interrogation 
techniques were approved by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
in various memoranda. The approved techniques included e.g. sleep deprivation for 
up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, the use of loud music or white noise, the use 
of diapers “generally not to exceed 72 hours,” attention grasps, facial and 
abdominal slaps, cramped confinement in a dark box for up to 18 hours, the 
combination of cramped confinement with the use of insects, various stress 
positions, sleep deprivation for up to 11 days, and the waterboarding technique.29  
The use of the so called enhanced interrogation techniques was legally justified 
based on the assumption that the detainees represented an imminent danger to the 
US. The detainees were considered organized and trained to conduct terrorist 
attacks and resist various interrogation techniques, and to possess knowledge about 
terrorist attacks in the making. Despite the explicit aim of eliciting “actionable 
intelligence,” the enhanced interrogation techniques were more effective in creating 
a new kind of subjectivity. In fact, the combination of interrogation and torture is 











detainees resign their own truth and adopt, or at least acknowledge the superiority 
of, the dominant truth. 30 
The torture procedures, which ultimately aim at the individual adopting a new 
subjectivity, resemble the logic of knowledge production in the Foucauldian sense; 
the dominant truth is reproduced through confession, a ritual in which the detainees 
give up their deviant version of the truth. Confession therefore has value not as 
information, but as a demonstration of submission. According to Scarry, “[i]n 
confession one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world [...] that the self is 
made up of. […] [I]t is for this reason that while the content of the prisoner’s 
answer is only sometimes important to the regime, the form of the answer, the fact 
of his answering, is always crucial.”31 A similar logic can be seen in the debriefing 
and Step Down policies exercised in the Californian supermax prisons, which are 
discussed in the following section.   
 
B  2 Debriefing and Step Down 
 
A few months in the solitary cell renders prisoners strangely impressible. The 
chaplain can then make the brawny navy cry like a child; he can work on his 











opinions on his patient’s mind, and fill his mouth with his own phrases and 
language.32  
 
California has four prisons, one of which is the Pelican Bay State Prison in 
Crescent City, which has a Security Housing Unit (SHU) where some inmates are 
segregated from other prisoners. The Pelican Bay and Sacramento State Prisons 
also have Psychiatric Service Units (PSU). California currently holds 
approximately 3500 to 4000 prisoners in SHUs, and 300 in PSUs.  Approximately a 
quarter to half of the prisoners in these institutions are placed in SHUs. The 
majority of the inmates in SHUs are male, and Latinos are over-represented among 
them. Being placed in a security housing unit (SHU) in a Californian prison 
requires that one has been deemed dangerous in some way.33 Officially, security 
housing units are “designed to house the State’s most serious criminal offenders in 
a secure, safe and disciplined institutional setting” and neither “designed nor 
intended as punishment for misbehavior.”34  Inmates can be placed in a SHU for six 
months to five years for violent offences committed in prison or indefinitely for 
being a validated gang member or associate. Currently, 107 inmates in California 
have served more than 20 years in an SHU, 303 have served more than 10 years, 











SHU indefinitely, approximately 21% are validated gang members, and 79% are  
associates.36 
The logic of the security unit is one of isolation. Prisoners in SHUs are isolated 
from other prisoners, from prison staff, and from their family and friends. A 
prisoner placed in an SHU typically spends 23 hours a day in a cell which is lit at 
all times. They are permitted to exercise in an indoor recreation cell for one hour a 
day. The number of personal items, such as books and photographs, is limited.37 
The defining element of solitary confinement is to minimize socially and 
psychologically meaningful interaction. Any available stimuli are usually 
monotonous, and existing social contacts lack empathy. Besides causing different 
physical and psychological effects, isolation is also an effective way to 
communicate to the prisoner that they have no power over themselves.38 Being 
released from indefinite solitary confinement requires that the prisoner assumes the 
subjectivity of a dangerous individual who must confess and repent in order to end 
the isolation. This process is called debriefing. 
 
The prisoners themselves admit essentially having only two options: to debrief or to 
die. In debriefing, the prisoners in SHUs who are identified as either gang members 
or associates must denounce all relations with gangs. The process consists of two 











investigative phase (i.e. interview) is “to provide staff with information about the 
gang’s structure, activities and affiliates” and to assess, among other things, the 
inmate’s sincerity. Reviews of the continued need for solitary confinement occur 
every six years.39  
Recently, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation launched a 
new “behavior-based” Step Down policy for identifying prison-based gang 
members and associates, and isolating them in SHUs.40 The gangs (i.e. the Security 
Threat Groups, STGs) are classified into three sub-groups according to the 
estimated threat level they pose to the security of the institution. STG-I, which 
represents the most severe threat, includes gangs such as the Aryan Brotherhood, 
the Black Guerilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, and the Nazi Low Riders.41 The idea 
of the Step Down program is essentially identical to that of debriefing. In the Step 
Down program, the prisoner demonstrates in five steps their “willingness to 
disengage from criminal gang behavior” and gradually earns certain privileges, 
such as more phone calls to relatives, permission to participate in courses, an 
increase in the maximum number of personal items, such as photographs, more 
opportunities to interact with other inmates, and finally permission to rejoin the 
general prison population. At any moment during the program, prisoners can be 
returned to a previous step until “they demonstrate a desire and behavior for 











least 12 months.42  
According to the think tank New Afrikan Revolutionary Nationalism (NARN), to 
successfully complete the Step Down program, “you must be willing to accept and 
believe all of the absolute worst things that the state has said about us all and 
continues to say – and to invalidate yourself completely.”43 From the point of view 
of the SHU inmate, debriefing and Step Down are violent processes of subject 
production in which prisoners must denounce their sympathies for the people, 
ideas, and lived experiences with which they identify. Debriefing and Step Down 
are examples of governmental techniques which, according to Garland, assume that 
rational actors can be manipulated to align their preferences with those of the 
governing authorities and to self-regulate in a way that feels freely chosen. 
Incentives and disincentives teach the prisoner to engage with institutional goals 
and to reflect them in their behavior.44 Inmates are forced into assuming a 
dangerous subjectivity in a process similar to that of confession: the inmate 
confesses their associations with deviants and re-establishes loyalty to the official 
regime. Again, as in using enhanced interrogation techniques, obtaining useful 
security information is only a secondary goal. 
Moreover, the release of SHU inmates into the general prison population fits with 
Foucault’s two principal uses of prisoners: firstly, prisoners, when released back 











provide the authorities with access to the underworld; secondly, released inmates 
moralize the working class, as they represent “the other” with whom the workers do 
not wish to identify.45 Similarly, releasing the SHU inmates back into the general 
prison population after debriefing maintains conflict between inmates and prevents 
them from developing unwanted solidarity, as the former SHU inmate is known to 
have betrayed himself and others like him during the debriefing process.  
 
Next, I move on to discuss the refugee subjectivity produced in the practices of 
“official indifference.”46 Unlike the detainee and the prisoner, the refugee is not the 
target of rehabilitation, reintegration or collaboration. Instead, they struggle with 
being dissolved into an anonymous mass in the eyes of officials. Nevertheless, the 
violence of subjectification they face is no less powerful.  
 
 
B   3 Official indifference 
 
Anyone will do whatever it takes to get his freedom. Some people tried to commit 
suicide to get free, others went crazy in there.47  
 











are defined by their dangerousness as individuals. The current refugee situation in 
Europe offers insight into the way in which the law actually does become 
indifferent regarding the individual, who is consequently dissolved into an 
anonymous mass. Agamben points out that “every time a refugee represents not 
individual cases, but – as happens more and more often today – [...] a mass 
phenomenon, [the UN] organizations and individual states prove themselves, 
despite their solemn invocation of the ‘sacred and inalienable’ rights of man, 
absolutely incapable of resolving the problem and even confronting it 
adequately.”48 Refugees are even discussed in terms that obscure the individual 
human being; they are “the mindless and unstoppable flood of human misery.”49  
During the last couple of years, Europe has faced dramatically increased numbers 
of people from the Middle East, particularly from Syria, seeking international 
protection.50 Between April 2011 and November 2015, over 800,000 asylum 
applications were filed by Syrian refugees in European countries. Alongside Syria, 
most refugees coming to Europe originate from Afghanistan and Iraq. An 
increasing number of refugees take their chances in the Mediterranean Sea, many of 
them in unseaworthy boats and dinghies. In 2015 there were over million arrivals 
by sea, predominantly in Greece, and approximately over 3700 died or went 
missing in the sea.51 In many places in Europe, refugees are merely managed, and 











Within the European Union, Greece has for years been an internal buffer zone, as 
attempts have been made to limit the number of people crossing the European 
border by, for example, employing enhanced patrolling and surveillance, and by 
partially fencing Greek borders. In addition, controversial practices such as 
pushbacks and round-ups have been used to control immigration and to “clean up 
the streets” of Athens.52  
Many other European Union countries have reintroduced border checks and have 
even partially fenced their borders in order to reduce the number of refugees 
entering.53 Many European refugee camps lack basic necessities such as proper 
food, shelter, and sanitation. Some camps have become centers where residents are 
“lost and forgotten” by the system; in Bulgaria, for example, the authorities do not 
register the people in the Harmanli camp as asylum seekers, and no one is in charge 
of the process.54 Although the camps are intended as temporary holding points, in 
many places, staying in the camp has become a permanent state with no realistic 
possibility for a fair, legal immigration process.55  
According to the European Union Asylum Procedures Directive,56 asylum seekers 
should not be detained solely for entering the country without authorization, but 
reports cite asylum seekers in places such as Greece being systematically detained 
for irregular entry. In practice, pre-removal detention is more the rule than the 











Detention and the Committee against Torture have also expressed concern over the 
frequent failure to properly register unaccompanied minors and their systematic 
detention.  While immigration detention is not intended as a punishment, many 
detained asylum seekers are subjected to similar treatment as criminal suspects and 
offenders, and in many places immigration detention has acquired an increasingly 
punitive nature.58 The length of detention varies, but is limited to 18 months in the 
European Union Returns Directive.59 In contrast, the UK has opted out of the 
directive and may practice indefinite detention, and in early 2014, the Greek legal 
council issued an advisory opinion allowing police to extend the length of detention 
beyond 18 months and potentially indefinitely in cases where detainees refuse to 
co-operate in their removal proceedings.60 
 
The immigrant detention camps in Greece have been criticized for various failures 
by NGOs, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment for both procedural problems and poor conditions, such as 
overcrowding, poor hygiene, lack of outdoor access, and lack of information on 
their rights.61 The Greek asylum procedure has been described as dysfunctional: 
filing claims of asylum has been made difficult, and reports indicate that the police 











requests to apply for asylum.62 Although the conditions at refugee camps are a 
partial result of the inability to accommodate large numbers of people seeking 
international protection and indifference to their needs, there is also a purposeful 
feature to it: the conditions are meant to communicate to potential immigrants that 
life in Europe is not desirable and to discourage them from coming.63 
 
Bordering the European Union, Turkey is an important channel for refugees 
entering Europe. Turkey currently hosts over 261,000 refugees in 25 camps, and an 
unknown number of people live outside of camps. Access to information, 
registration, and public services is acutely limited. In order to deter the refugees 
from entering Europe the European Union and Turkey agreed in March 2016 that 
“all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 
March 2016 will be returned to Turkey”, and that for every Syrian being returned to 
Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU.  
 
For as long as refugees are unable to call on the law to recognize them, they are 
invisible to the law as individuals, despite the crowding in refugee camps. To the 
refugees, the law appears deaf and excruciatingly slow to grant recognition; the law 
also seems schizophrenic: on one hand it promises individual asylum processes and 












The European situation has many contemporary and preceding parallels,64 but for 
the purposes of this article, the most interesting of them is Guantanamo Bay, which 
served as a detention site for over 12,000 Haitian refugees fleeing a military coup at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Even then, Guantanamo’s convenient geographic 
location was not the main reason for establishing camps there; while under US 
control, Guantanamo was not actually inside the United States, which in practice 
undermined the refugees’ access to due process. Guantanamo Bay was intended to 
serve as a “buffer zone” preventing the refugees from reaching US territory. The 
Haitian refugees were classified according to their ability to convince the migration 
officers of a “credible fear” of persecution. Some of them were returned to Haiti, 
while the ones successful in their claim for protection were transferred to the US 
mainland to undergo further assessment. 65  
 
Guantanamo Bay also became a detention site for Haitians who tested positive for 
HIV. In the case of Haitian Centers Council v. Sale66, the US District Court ordered 
that HIV-positive detainees be brought into the US. The ruling did not, however, 
affect the legality of the immigration detention center in Guantanamo, which 
continued to be used for detaining asylum seekers from Haiti and Cuba.67 Some 
refugees at Guantanamo Bay contested the legality of the restrictions on access to 
lawyers in the camps, the camp conditions, and the legitimacy of indefinite 











with some success. The government, however, consistently insisted that the 
refugees were not entitled to the rights guaranteed under US law simply because 
they were outside US territory.68 As the state is not, as argued above, able to escape 
the law or to create extra-legal territories, the law in situations such as these 
becomes a tool to create, not exceptions, but parallel legal realities with reduced 
subject positions for the Other. 
 
At the intersection of power and violence, there is still room for resistance. In the 
following, the resistance strategies adopted by refugees, detainees, and prisoners 
are discussed in more detail. The analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, but 
rather illustrative of the possibilities for resistance within the legal framework and 
their inevitable deficiencies as means for fundamental change in state practices. 
Hunger striking, for example, is discussed as a way of renouncing the legal 
language and restoring one’s own understanding of oneself. Hunger striking and 
judicial litigation are often two parallel processes, sometimes even with similar 
objectives, but with fundamentally different possibilities, messages, and effects.69 
 












Greece's incapacity to ensure an appropriate asylum procedure was recognized by 
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
(2011).70 The Dublin II Regulation71 determines which EU member state is 
responsible for the examination of an asylum application lodged in one of the 
member states by a third-country national. Primarily, the application is examined in 
the country where the asylum seeker has first entered the European Union area. In 
the case M.S.S., an asylum seeker was sent from Belgium to Greece, as that is 
where he had first entered the union. In Greece he was placed in detention twice, 
during which he was subjected to degrading detention circumstances: the detention 
facilities were overcrowded and lacked clean water, sanitation, and mattresses. 
After being released from detention, he lived on the streets without any support 
from the Greek government. The main question was whether Belgium was allowed 
to transfer the applicant back to Greece, where the problems faced by the asylum 
seekers were systemic and well documented. According to the court, Belgium had 
violated Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights by exposing the applicant to the risks 
of the deficient asylum procedure and inadequate living conditions in Greece.  
According to Gina Clayton, the case was groundbreaking in that the general living 
conditions facing M.S.S., who was one of thousands, were considered inhuman and 











In principle, the law protects the refugee from inefficient asylum procedures and 
degrading conditions in individual cases, but in practice, the law continues to allow 
refugees to be abandoned in the streets and “richer western European member states 
[to] continue to shift their responsibility to overburdened southern European 
member states”.73 The law’s role in resistance is inevitably ambivalent. A similar 
ambivalence can be detected in the cases of supermax prisoners and Guantanamo 
Bay detainees who have successfully challenged some of the practices of the 
government through legal channels, but whose position nevertheless has remained 
fundamentally unchanged. In 2012, on behalf of prisoners who spent 10 to 28 years 
in solitary confinement, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit against 
the State of California for its use of prolonged solitary confinement in Pelican Bay 
prison. The class action Ashker v. Brown challenged the prolonged solitary 
confinement and deprivation of a meaningful review process based on the rights 
guaranteed under the 8th and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution.  
 
The Ashker case was settled in September 2015. According to the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, the settlement “transforms California’s use of solitary 
confinement from a status-based system to a behavior-based system,” introducing a 
two-year Step Down procedure. Moreover, all prisoners who had been in solitary 











population. California must also create a new Restricted Custody General 
Population Unit as an alternative to solitary confinement.74  Despite these reforms, 
it seems that there will be no fundamental changes in the logic of debriefing and 
Step Down, and the subjectivities they produce. 
 
While the Guantanamo Bay detainees have been successful in establishing the 
jurisdiction of the US courts over the detention center, despite its location in Cuban 
territory (Rasul v. Bush 2004)75, and in establishing the rights to due process 
(Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 200476; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 200677; Boumediene v. Bush 
200878), nothing has prevented the detainees from being held in indefinite 
detention, without being charged with or convicted of a crime, but also without the 
hope of ever being released. This is what the law has become to them.  
 
A  V. Martyring 
 
As an alternative to resistance through legal channels, hunger striking can be seen 
as a way of rejecting the subjectivity of a detainee or a prisoner, subjectivities 
which are restrained by the perception of danger and threat, and reduced in the 
sense that they do not, by default, possess all the legal rights granted for the citizen 











prisons as an attempt to establish hunger striking as a viable, sustainable form of 
political action and of the production of new kinds of political subjects.79  
On October 20, 2000 in Turkey began what would become the longest and most 
deadly hunger strike in modern history. The strike went on for three years with 
more than 2000 people, of whom 107 died. The hunger strikers protested against 
the transfer of political prisoners to F-type prisons that were designed to isolate 
prisoners and to limit or deny interaction between them, which also made it easier 
for torture and ill-treatment to go unnoticed. The hunger strikers demanded 
immediate and unconditional repeal of the Anti-Terror Law, independent 
monitoring of prisons and the treatment of prisoners, the release of prisoners 
suffering from permanent injury or illness as a result of previous hunger strikes, and 
trials for prison staff and others accused of torturing the prisoners.80 
Despite hunger strikers aiming at these concrete improvements, it would be a 
mistake to see their struggle strictly in terms of presenting a list of demands.  81  
Anderson argues that the Turkish hunger strikes function as a performance to 
refigure the relationship between the state and the subject, and to introduce a new 
kind of political subjectivity.82 The F-type prison, similarly to Guantanamo and the 
supermax, was created for the “worst of the worst,” for the dangerous subject.  It 
can be argued that the supermax hunger strikers challenged precisely the aspect of 











supermax, perceive themselves as being punished not only for crimes, but for their 
political views – not only for what they have done, but for who they are. 
The Ashker case was part of a larger movement to reform the conditions in SHUs, 
which, interestingly, was sparked by hunger strikes by thousands of SHU prisoners 
in 2011 and 2013.83 The plaintiffs in the case participated in hunger strikes in 
protest against the gang validation process preceding indefinite solitary 
confinement.84 According to the Pelican Bay hunger strikers, inmates can be 
assigned to a SHU with no significant disciplinary record based on alleged gang 
affiliation, which, in turn, can be based on vague, insignificant, and arbitrary 
evidence.85 Some supermax inmates confined in SHUs claim that they were 
validated as gang members or associates merely because of their political views and 
activities, and that the Departmental Review Board advised them to refrain from 
political writings.86 The Pelican Bay hunger strike in 2013 spread to 13 other state 
prisons and, at its peak, involved tens of thousands of people incarcerated in 
California.87  
 
Perceived dangerousness is also the explicated reason for detaining terrorist 
suspects at Guantanamo. In practice, legal channels for contesting the detention 
have been ineffective for most of the detainees, and with no other way to establish 











have been a regular occurrence among the detainees.88 The hunger strikers have 
demanded treatment in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, better 
living conditions, respectful treatment of the Quran by guards, fair trials, and 
freedom. The longest hunger strike was initiated in 2005 by Abdul Rahman 
Shalabi, who was among the first to be brought to Guantanamo in 2002. Shalabi’s 
hunger strike lasted for nine years, during which time he was fed with a nasogastric 
tube every day.89 Tariq Ba Odah, another detainee captured in 2002, has not been 
eating voluntarily since 2007. He is in grave danger of dying despite being force 
fed, as he has lost almost half of his ideal bodyweight. As many others, Ba Odah 
has been cleared for release, but still held in detention. According to him, 
“[p]rotesting by hunger striking is the only way to communicate [to those with 
freedom] what it means to be unjustly detained, to be put in a cell for over a decade 
without charge.”90 Ba Odah’s attorney has asked a federal judge to order his client’s 
release by reason of his progressive physical and psychological deterioration. The 
officials, however, are reluctant to agree, as they fear setting a precedent for other 
detainees, encouraging them to stop eating as well. Instead, Ba Odah’s hunger 
strike is deemed “non-compliant” behavior, and he is being kept in solitary 
confinement.91 
What explains such measures from the state against hunger strikers, who are not, 











dimension of hunger striking as resistance seems to be very strong. From the state’s 
perspective, resistance must be quashed in order to preserve the dominant truth: in 
Guantanamo Bay, participating in a hunger strike is considered a disciplinary 
matter and is treated with force. Hunger strikers have been subjected to solitary 
confinement, and those whose condition has worsened have been force-fed twice 
daily in restraint chairs.92 In response to these measures, the detainees have 
attempted suicide and rioted, which, in turn, has provoked a response with rubber 
bullets and pepper spray.93 Hunger strikes were also met with a violent response in 
Turkey: in 1995, 1999, and 2000 the government undertook military operations 
both inside and outside prisons. In the operation Return to Life in 2000, 30 inmates 
and two military personnel were killed in 20 prisons, many more were injured, and 
more than 1000 were forcibly transferred to the F-type prison.94 
Hunger striking and suicide attempts can also be confronted with discursive tactics. 
The political aspect of bodily resistance can be defused by altering the vocabulary 
used to describe it;  US officials have described acts of self-harm, such as hunger 
striking and suicide attempts, as “manipulative self-injurious behavior,” 
“strangulation gestures,” and “coordinated efforts to disrupt camp operations.” 
These acts have also been identified as violent acts of war, even as “asymmetrical 
warfare,” which aims to delegitimize self-harm as a form of resistance.95  











different from that of the detainee and the prisoner. For refugees, hunger striking is 
a way to make their individual existence apparent. There are numerous cases of 
hunger strikes, lip sewing, and other forms of non-violent, bodily resistance among 
European refugees.96  
 
The official and unofficial refugee camps in Calais, France, the “Calais Jungle,” 
have become a housing site for thousands of refugees, many of them from Syria. 
The living conditions are completely inadequate: people are living in tents, no 
proper sanitation facilities are available, and there is a constant lack of food, 
clothes, and medical care. In 2014, 30 refugees in Calais went on a hunger strike 
demanding proper housing, sanitation facilities, free movement, proper food, and 
negotiations between France and the UK to allow the refugees to enter British 
territory to claim asylum there.97 Recently, a group of refugees stranded at the 
border between Greece and Macedonia went on a hunger strike in protest against a 
filtering system adopted by some Balkan countries for rejecting those classed as 
economic migrants without examining each case individually.98 And in April 2013 
detained refugees at the Amygdaleza camp in Greece went on a hunger strike to 
protest the conditions of their detention. Another 2000 immigrants held at centers 
around the country soon joined their strike.99 While the Guantanamo detainees and 
supermax prisoners reject their subjectivities through hunger striking, the refugees 











becoming recognized as individuals instead of being dissolved into an anonymous 
mass.  
Regarding the claims made by the hunger strikers, hunger strikes have not perhaps 
been very effective. But rather than effective in this sense, hunger strikes can be 
understood as an attempt to call the law out on its hypocrisy: the law grants the 
Guantanamo detainees the right of Habeas Corpus, yet, by allowing ongoing 
indefinite detention, robs those rights of their practical meaning; the law claims to 
provide universal human rights for all, yet in practice favors citizens; the law alters 
our perception by claiming that solitary confinement in a supermax is not about 
punishment, but about security; the law provides legal protection, but in practice 
effectively blocks access to it.  
 
Hunger striking has proved to be a way to contest not only the practices of law, but 
also its creations: the subjectivities of the detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee. 
Moreover, it is a way to establish shared realities and communal ties within and 
beyond the boundaries of the three sites discussed in this article. The sheer number 
of people participating in hunger strikes is staggering: in 2013 more than 2000 
immigrants held in detention centres in Greece went on a hunger strike to denounce 
the intolerable conditions and to protest the Greek government’s decision to extend 











prisons was joined by activists outside prisons, particularly in the Kücük Armutlu 
neighborhood in Istanbul;100 and the Pelican Bay hunger strike in 2013 spread to 
prisons across California and involved tens of thousands of participants. To return 
to Cover’s argument about torture being aimed at destroying “the victim’s 
normative world and capacity to create shared realities,”101 the prevalence of 
hunger striking indicates that it indeed is a way to resist torture practices. 
 
A VI. Conclusion 
 
In the closed facilities discussed in this article, the subject production process 
involves violent techniques such as torture in the form of enhanced interrogation 
techniques, solitary confinement, debriefing, poor living conditions, and practices 
that block access to justice – all practices supported by the law, either explicitly or 
implicitly. To some extent, the legal claims made by the detainee, the prisoner, and 
the refugee to contest these practices have been successful, but have failed to bring 
forth a more fundamental change in their relationship with the state. The hunger 
strikers, the martyrs, on the other hand, deconstruct their subjectivity by disfiguring 
it with their own bodies, create new shared realities among them, and force the law 
to face its own violence. They refuse to be subjectified as enemy combatants, as 











anonymous mass. The hunger strikers reveal the violence behind the state’s power 
practices by refusing to adopt the reduced subjectivities reserved for them. The 
hunger striker does not speak the law, since speaking the law requires the hunger 
striker to appeal to, and thus reproduce, the dominant value system either out of 
genuine ethical incorporation or for strategic reasons.102  
 
Taking the law for all that it does blurs the distinctions between the law and power, 
the law and politics, and the law and the state. The state, power, and politics are 
present in the law, just as they are all present in the three sites discussed in this 
article. Agamben’s observation of opposites dissolving into each other is taken here 
to its logical conclusion: bios and zoe, inside and outside, rule and exception 
become indistinguishable; there is neither inside nor outside, and there is no reason 
to try to protect the law from its inherent violence by reproducing the dichotomy of 
law/force, and thereby outsourcing the law’s violence.103 Rights are not the same 
for all. The profound distinction between us and the Other is constantly recreated in 
legal practices which divide people according to their characteristics and status. The 
law has not one subject position, but multiple positions for qualitatively different 
kinds of subjects: the citizen, the prisoner, the asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant, 
the enemy combatant, the detainee. Any one of us could become subjectified as any 












Throughout this article one of my main claims has been that unlike the subjectivity 
of the refugee, the subjectivities of the detainee and the prisoner are inseparably 
accompanied by the notion of danger. This, however, seems to be changing as the 
refugee is increasingly regarded as a potential security threat in Europe. The 
terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 in which 129 people were killed and 
hundreds more were wounded is the latest incident resulting in increased suspicion 
towards refugees and immigrants, as according to initial rumors, some of the 
suspects had entered Europe as Syrian refugees. It was later confirmed that the 
attackers were all European Union nationals, but the fear of ISIS fighters 
infiltrating Europe among refugees persists.  
 
Securitizing the issue of asylum seeking, and perceiving refugees as threat to the 
ethno-cultural compilation, economic stability, and physical integrity of the state 
and individuals, is not, in itself, a new phenomenon.105 Currently the refugees are 
predominantly treated as a mass in Europe, as illustrated by the recent EU – Turkey 
refugee deal. While the EU has assured that every asylum application will be 
treated individually on a case by case basis, and that there will be no blanket and 
automatic returns for asylum seekers, Amnesty International has expressed its 
concern over large-scale forced returns of refugees from Turkey to Syria.106 The 
deportations began practically immediately after the deal came into force. Currently 











conditions and without access to proper asylum process.107 The international 
medical humanitarian organization Doctors Without Borders has ended its activities 
in Moria detention center in Lesvos island, because “continuing to work inside 
would make us complicit in a system we consider to be both unfair and 
inhumane”.108  
 
The recent changes in the laws and other state practices concerning the refugee 
indicate, that the refugee subjectivity is growing increasingly fragmented.109 If the 
aspect of danger becomes an intrinsic feature of the individual refugee subject, it is 
possible that their treatment starts to increasingly resemble that of the detainee and 
the prisoner, and that the “dangerous individuals” are screened and singled out from 
the mass. The refugees are facing a double challenge, as they strive firstly to be 
recognized as individuals, and secondly to be recognized as genuine refugees 
deserving humanitarian protection. The examples of subject production techniques 
discussed in this article illustrate the process in which the violent practices produce 
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